1. The intention of the legislature is manifested in the language which the legislature has chosen to employ. If the words of a statute are clear or unambiguous, such words must be given their ordinary, natural and recognized meaning attributed to them unless they have acquired a technical or special legal meaning.
2. The meaning of the statute is to be gathered from the words used in the statute itself. If the intention of the legislature is clear, that intention constitutes the law. An statute is the authentic repository of the legislative will and the function of the court is to interpret it according to the intent of the legislature.
3. Each word, phrase or sentence in a Statute is to be considered in the light of the general purpose of the Act itself. The Legislature indicates its intention by the language it chooses to employ.
4. The factors which can be taken into consideration to ascertain the intention of the legislature are – the history of the Act, the reasons which led to the passing of the Act, the mischief which had to be cured and other provisions of the statute. In order to find out the legislative intent, we have to find out what was the mischief that the legislature wanted to remedy.
5. The Legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain. It should not be assumed that the Legislature used language without any purpose. It is a settled principle of construction that every word in a Statute is employed with some purpose in order to further the objectives laid down in the preamble of the Act itself. We must assume that the Legislature deliberately used that expression. The words in an Act of Parliament must be construed in such a manner as to give them a sensible meaning.
6. It is the duty of the Court to make such construction of a Statute which shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. The courts must in general must take it absolutely for granted that the Legislature has said what it meant and meant what it has said. It is a settled principle of construction that every word in a Statute is employed with some purpose in order to further the objectives laid down in the preamble of the Act itself.
7. I crave leave to cite here few judgments of Supreme Court which speaks about as how the provisions of a Statute are to be understood and dealt with.
8. The dominant purpose in construing the statute is to ascertain the intention of the legislature. This intention, and, therefore, the meaning of the statute, is primarily to be sought in the words used in the statute itself., which must, if they are plain and unambiguous be applied as they stand, however strongly it may be suspected that the result does not represent the real intention of the legislature. In approaching the matter from this angle, it is a duty of the court to give fair and full effect to statute which is plain and unambiguous without regard to particular consequence in a special case. Harchand Singh versus Smt Shivarani, 1981 All WC 273 (SC) (per D A Desai J.).
9. The Court endeavours to interpret the provision of a statute in a manner that will achieve the object of the provision, avoid mischief and advance the cause of justice, make the law workable, enforceable and best harmonize with and effectuate the object of the legislation.
10. Each word, phrase, or sentence is to be considered in the light of the general purpose of the Act itself. That is the rule of purposive legislation. AIR 1953 SC 274.
11. A provision has to be read and understood in the context of the entire scheme of the enactment. AIR 1995 SC 2329.
12. Subha Rao, C.J. speaking for the Bench in Chandra Mohan v. State of UP, has pointed out that the fundamental rule of interpretation is that in construing the provisions of the Constitution or the Act of Parliament, the Court "will have to find out the express intention from the words of the Constitution or the Act, as the case may be.
13. In the case of Nothman versus Barnet Council, [1978] 1 WLR 220, quoting Lord Denning, in all cases now in interpretation of statutes, we adopt such a construction as will “promote the general legislative purpose” underlying the provision. There is no reason why we should not follow it at once without waiting for a statute to tell us.
14. The observation of Justice Das Gupta also deserves to be noted. The intention of the legislature has always to be gathered by words used by it, giving to the words- plain, normal, grammatical meaning.
15. In the field of Interpretation of Statutes, the Court always presume that the legislature inserted part of it with a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. [ Sankar Ram & Co. V Kasi Naikar, (2003) 11 SCC 699]
16. Interpretation should make sense and not nonsense of the legislation, AIR 1954 Nag 43.
17. Where the language of the section clearly expresses the intention of the Legislature, it must be given effect to. State versus Ramjivan Kaluram, AIR 1962 Bom 8, 12; State of Punjab versus Ajaib Singh, 1953 SCR 254, 264 (Das J.); Mysore State Electricity Board versus Bangalore Woolen etc mills Ltd AIR 1963 SC 1128.
18. In the field of Interpretation of Statutes, the Court always presume that the legislature inserted part of it with a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. [ Sankar Ram & Co. V Kasi Naikar, (2003) 11 SCC 699]
19. Justice Gajendragadkar said in a case that the first and primary rule of interpretation is that the intention of the Legislature must be found in the words used in the Legislation itself. [ kanailal Sur V Paramnidhi Sadukan, AIR 1957 ]
20. When a language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning no question of construction of a statute arises for the Act speak for itself. [St of UP V Vijay Anand Maharaj, AIR 1963] ; It is not open to first create an ambiguity and then look for some principles of Interpretations. [ Patangrao Kadam V Prithviraj S Deshmukh]
21. When the words are capable of giving a plain meaning, it is said that the Courts should not busy themselves with supposed intention or with the policy underlying the Statute. [Pakala NArayaanaswamy V Emperor, AIR 1939 PC 47]; Justice Gajendragadkar in Gurmej Singh V Pratap Singh Kairon, AIR 1960.]
22. When the Word SHALL is used in a statute the presumption is that its use is imperative and not merely directory, particularly when it is addressed to a court or to a public servant and when a right or benefit depends on its imperative use.[ CPC 1908- Order 14, Rule 2.]
23. Whenever a statute comes up for consideration it must be remembered that it is not within human powers to foresee the manifold sets of facts which may arise, and, even if it were, it is not possible to provide for them in terms free from all ambiguity.
24. The dominant purpose in construing the statute is to ascertain the intention of the legislature. This intention, and, therefore, the meaning of the statute, is primarily to be sought in the words used in the statute itself., which must, if they are plain and unambiguous be applied as they stand, however strongly it may be suspected that the result does not represent the real intention of the legislature. In approaching the matter from this angle, it is a duty of the court to give fair and full effect to statute which is plain and unambiguous without regard to particular consequence in a special case. Harchand Singh versus Smt Shivarani, 1981 All WC 273 (SC) (per D A Desai J.).
25. A Statute is best understood if we know the reason for it. The reason for a Statute is the safest guide to its interpretation. The words of a Statute take their colour from the reason for it.
26. The factors which can be taken into consideration to ascertain the intention of the legislature are – the history of the Act, the reasons which led to the passing of the Act, the mischief which had to be cured and other provisions of the statute. In order to find out the legislative intent, we have to find out what was the mischief that the legislature wanted to remedy.
27. Where the language of the section clearly expresses the intention of the Legislature, it must be given effect to, regardless of the consequences, and the court cannot consider the fact that such effect causes hardship or inconvenience. Inconvenience is never considered as a decisive factor in interpreting a statute. State v. Ramjivan Kaluram, AIR 1962 Bom 8, 12; State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh, 1953 SCR 254, 264 (Das J.); Mysore State Electricity Board v. Bangalore Woolen etc mills Ltd AIR 1963 SC 1128. Merely because a law causes hardship, it cannot be interpreted in a manner so as to defeat its object.[ R Balakrishnapillai V St Of Kerala, (2003) 9 SCC 700]
28. Subba Rao, C.J. speaking for the Bench in Chandra Mohan v. State of UP. has pointed out that the fundamental rule of interpretation is that in construing the provisions of the Constitution or the Act of Parliament, the Court "will have to find out the express intention from the words of the Constitution or the Act, as the case may be.
29. It is a settled principle of construction that every word in a Statute is employed with some purpose in order to further the objectives laid down in the preamble of the Act itself. Each word, phrase or sentence in a Statute is to be considered in the light of the general purpose of the Act itself. That is the rule of purposive legislation. AIR 1953 SC 274.
30. In given circumstances, it is permissible for Courts to have functional approach and look into the legislative intention and sometimes it may be even necessary to go behind the words of an enactment and take other factors into consideration to give effect to the legislative intention and to the purpose and spirit of the enactment so that no absurdity or practical inconvenience may result and the legislative exercise and its scope and object may not become futile.
31. In case a particular provision is capable of two interpretations, that should be preferred which fulfils the policy of the Act and is more beneficial to the person in whose interest the Act has been passed. Laws are framed with the fascinating object of advancing the well being of the society collectively and each member individually.
32. In the case of Nothman versus Barnet Council, [1978] 1 WLR 220, quoting Lord Denning, in all cases now in interpretation of statutes, we adopt such a construction as will “promote the general legislative purpose” underlying the provision. There is no reason why we should not follow it at once without waiting for a statute to tell us.
33. The Court endeavours to interpret the provision of a statute in a manner that will achieve the object of the provision, avoid mischief and advance the cause of justice, make the law workable, enforceable and best harmonize with and effectuate the object of the legislation.
34. It should not be assumed that the Legislature used language without any purpose. It is a settled principle of construction that every word in a Statute is employed with some purpose in order to further the objectives laid down in the preamble of the Act itself. We must assume that the Legislature deliberately used that expression.
35. The intention of the legislature is manifested in the language which the legislature has chosen to employ. If the words of a statute are clear or unambiguous, such words must be given their ordinary, natural and recognized meaning attributed to them unless they have acquired a technical or special legal meaning. The courts must in general must take it absolutely for granted that the Legislature has said what it meant and meant what it has said.
36. Where if the law is open to diverse construction, that construction which accords best with the intention of the legislature and advances the purpose of the legislation, is to be preferred.
37. Law is designed to further the ends of justice but not to frustrate on technicalities. Legislature cannot be asked to sit to resolve the difficulties in implementation of its intention and spirit of law - Court can mould or creatively interpret the legislation by liberally interpreting the statute Courts can have functional approach and go behind the words to give effects to the legislative intention and spirit of the enactment.
38. The rule of law contemplates that every provision of law should be given its normal meaning and should be interpreted with objectivity. The law is not static and is mutable.A Statute is best interpreted when we know why it was created – RBI versus Peerless General Finance & Investment Company Ltd – AIR 1987 SC 1023;
39. The judicial interpretation given to words defined in one statute does not afford a guide to constructions of the same words in another statute unless the statutes are pari materia statutes. Gwalior Rayons versus Custodian of vested Forests – AIR 1990 SC 1747; Hari Khemu Gowali versus Dy. Commr of Police – AIR 1956 SC 559; 1956 SCR 664.
40. While interpreting a particular provision in a Statute, one should squarely look at the words, in the light of what is expressly expressed – Azad Tobacco Fac (P) Ltd versus CIT – (1997) 225 ITR 1002 (1007) (All).
41. Consequences which are likely to flow from a particular interpretation should be considered while interpreting a Statute – British Airways Plc versus UOI – AIR 2002 SC 391.
42. A verbis legis non est recedendum – from the words of the law there should be no departure.
43. Absoluta Sententia expositare non indigent – Plain words require no explanation.
44. (2009) 10 SCC 755 (IOS)
45. Preamble – Interpretation has to be as per social settings of the country and not in abstract – AIR 2011 SC 1485.
46. The open ended nature of the Constitution needs a harmonious conciliation between various competing principles in the ever changing shadow of socio economic reality in this country – (2011) 4 SCC 769 – Para 18.
47. Non obstante clause – two enactments – AIR 2012 SC 11 – Para 38
48. AIR 2011 SC 1925 – 8, 9, 13, 14, 39.
49. Noscitur a Socii – a word is known by the company it keeps – AIR 2011 SC 2122 – Paras 12, 47, 48.
50. Reading words in Statute not permissible - 2011 (2) AIR Bom R 62 (SC) – Civil Application No.9704/2010 – Judg date: 16.11.2010.
51. Duty of the court – 2011 (3) AIR Bom R 531 – Para 32 – WP: 618/2010 – Judg date: 08.04.2011.
52. Intention of Legislature – AIR 2011 SC 3470 – Para 54
53. Practical interpretation – (2012) 2 SCC 108 – Paras 16 to 19, 24, 30, 37, 49, 22, 23, 39 to 41, 43, 61, 45, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 58, 87(2), 62, 64, 67, 69, 71, 76, 72, 77
54. Each word / phrase / sentence is to be construed in the light of general purpose of the Act itself – Babasaheb Devidasrao versus Addl Divi Commr – 2012 (1) All MR 722 – Paras 9, 10
55. Debate – healthy – appointment of SC judges – pressure of precedents – ultimate question, is, must be – what do the words of the text mean in our time – (2011) 1 SCC 496 – Para 13.
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