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"Equality before Law" vis a vis Classification principle - Article 14

The principles enshrined under the expression “Equality before law”, employed in Article 14 of our Constitution, has its application in cases where the Law makers or the Executive govts, or the administrative authorities, in the exercise of their discretion and powers, makes any law or policy or takes any other decision, by which, benefits or privileges are conferred upon few persons only, to the exclusion of masses, or, where obligations are imposed upon a certain class of persons only, and not upon the masses; and the said discrimination which is being practiced has no rational or appreciable logic. This write up sought to unfold the attributes of classification principles.

1.      1.         In a democratic society governed by the rule of law, it is the duty of the State to do what is fair and   just to citizens and the State should not seek to defeat the legitimate claims of citizens.

2.      The Legislature, with some specific objects in mind to be achieved, makes the law. Every law, ordinarily, either confers some benefit or imposes some obligation.

3.      And, in the backdrop of the objects of the law, the said law is made applicable to a certain class of persons, that is to say, for example, the benefits are extended to a class of persons only, and not to every person, and similarly the law which imposes obligations, are made applicable to a certain class of persons only, and not to every person. This may sound patent discrimination, but it may not be so.

4.      Such classification or discrimination by law is permissible, provided two conditions must be satisfied – The classification of persons must be based on rational and sound parameters; AND (b) such classification must further the cause of the legislation.

5.      In other words, the beneficial or burdened class of persons who are grouped together must possess a common characteristic justifying their inclusion in the group, and those who are excluded must be distinct from those who are included; AND the said conferment of benefit or obligations imposed, upon the said class of persons, to the exclusion of other persons, must have a rational nexus with the object of the law which has created such classification.

6.      And, therefore, the classification of persons or things made by a law, may be challenged on two independent grounds – (a) THAT the classification of persons made under the law is not based on rational and sound parameters; or (b) The classification of persons made under the law may be rational and sound, but the benefits conferred or the obligations imposed, upon the class of persons, has no relation / nexus with the object of the legislation; or to say, the said conferment or obligations does not furthers the cause of the legislation.

7.      In order to justify the validity of law, the criterion of classification of persons or things, proposed in the law, must have direct relationship with the object of the law. If the means (classification) resorted to, does not furthers in the attainment of the object of the legislation, then, the means becomes suspect. It also follows that means employed (classification proposed) must be “reasonable and rational”, in order to achieve a particular end (object of the legislation), that is to say, the object of the legislation must justify the discrimination which is proposed in the legislation. And, at the cost of repetition, there must be rational and sound parameters to classify people or things, before subjecting people or things to liabilities, or before conferring privileges upon people.

8.      What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. The fact that the classification by itself is reasonable is not enough to support it, unless there is nexus between the classification and the object to be achieved.

9.      A reasonable classification is one which includes all who are similarly situated and none who are not. The question then is: what does the phrase 'similarly situated' mean ? The answer to the question is that we must look beyond the classification, to the purpose of the law. A reasonable classification is one which includes all persons who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law. The purpose of a law may be either the elimination of a public mischief or the achievement of some positive public good.

10.  Article 14 of the Constitution enjoins upon the State not to deny to any person 'Equality before law' or 'the equal protection of laws' within the territory of India.

11.  Equality before law is a dynamic concept having many facets. One facet - the most commonly acknowledged - is that there shall be no privileged person or class and that none shall be above law. The concept of equality permits rational discrimination; and conferment of special benefits / privileges to a class of persons but for rational reasons.

12.  Classification is implicit in the concept of Equality. Equality means equality among equals. Equality before law means that amongst equals, the law should be equal. The principle of equality means that a law may not have universal application towards all persons, and may not be applicable to such persons who by nature, attainment or circumstances, are not in the same position as to others.

13.  The concept of equality before law, implies that among equals, the law should be equal, and the likes should be treated alike. Article 14 proceeds on the premise that equality of treatment is required to be given to persons who are equally circumstanced; and the persons who are in fact unequally situated / circumstanced, cannot be treated at par.

14.  Classification means segregation in classes which have a systematic relationship, usually found in common properties and characteristics. It postulates a rational basis and does not mean hording together of certain persons and classes at whims and fancies. The classification may be founded on different bases, namely, geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration.

15.  Article 14 analysis deals with cases where the law makes irrational / unjustified (arbitrary) / unreasonable classification of persons, and thereby grant benefits / imposes obligations, upon some persons and not upon other persons, although both classes of persons are similarly situated; or where the law imposes obligations upon all persons, although the class of persons included in the said law are differently positioned in their life.

16.  The mandate of Article 14, that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law, is designed to protect all persons against legislative discrimination; and is designed to check legislations which confers privileges or imposes obligations, upon a class of persons only and not upon others, without any reasonable and sound basis.

17.  It is plain that every classification is in some degree likely to produce some inequality, but mere production of inequality is not by itself enough. The inequality produced, in order to invoke the rigours of Article 14, must be "actually and palpably unreasonable and arbitrary.

18.  If there is a classification, the Court will not hold it invalid merely because the law might have been extended to other persons who in some respects might resemble the class for which the law was made, for, the Legislature is the best judge of the needs of the particular classes and to estimate the degree of evil so as to adjust its legislation according to the exigency found to exist. The law can make and set apart the classes according to the needs and exigencies of the society and as suggested by experience.

19.  Article 14 does not insist upon classification, which is scientifically perfect or logically complete. A classification would always be justified, unless it is patently arbitrary. One who assails a classification must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, or, the classification is although reasonable, but the nature of benefit conferred or obligations imposed, has no relationship with the object of the law.

20.  The classification must not be arbitrary but must be rational, that is to say, it must not only be based on some qualities or characteristics which are to be found in all the persons grouped together and not in others who are left out, but those qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation.

21.  Classification necessarily implies the making of a distinction or discrimination between persons classified and those who are not members of that class. It is the essence of a classification that upon the class are cast duties and burdens, different from these resting upon the general public.

22.  A rule of procedure laid down by law comes as much within the purview of Article 14 as any rule of substantive law and it is necessary that all litigants, who are similarly situated, are able to avail themselves of the same procedural rights for relief and for defence with like protection and without discrimination.

23.  If, however, there is, on the face of the statute, no classification at all or none on the basis of any apparent difference specially peculiar to any particular individual or class and not applicable to any other person or class of persons and yet the law bites only the particular class of individuals, it is nothing but an attempt to arbitrarily single out an individuals.

24.  To attract the operation of the Equality clause, it is necessary to show that the application of law is unreasonable or arbitrary, and that the purported classification of persons does not rest on any rational basis, having regard to the object which the legislature has in view.

25.  A classification is under-inclusive when all who are included in the class are tainted with the mischief, but there are others who are also tainted with the mischief, but they are not included, for no appreciable reason. In other words, a classification is bad as under-inclusive when the law benefits or burdens persons in a manner that furthers a legitimate purpose, but does not confer the same benefit or place the same burden upon persons on others, who are similarly situated. A classification is over-inclusive when it includes not only those who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose, but also takes within its sweep others, who are not so situated as well. In other words, this type of classification imposes a burden upon a wider range of individuals, and thereby imposes burden upon a class of persons, who are not the class of persons, at which the law aims to suppress the mischief, that is to say, where a class of persons are covered by the law, although they materially differs in the common properties and characteristics of persons, for whom especially the law was enacted, and its like hording together of certain persons and classes at whims and fancies.

Approach of the Court in applying facts of the case at the touchstone of the principle enshrined under Article 14

1.      The constitutional standards by which the “rationality or soundness”, of the classification may be measured, has been repeatedly stated by the courts.

2.      Prima facie, there will always be presumption in favour of the constitutionality of the Statute / Policy of the State;

3.      If a legislation discriminates one person or class of persons against others similarly situated and denies to the former the privileges that are enjoyed by the latter, it may be regarded as "hostile" in the sense that it affects injuriously the interests of that persons or class.

4.      That while good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on the part of a Legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing on the face of the law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the notice of the Court on which the classification may reasonably be regarded as based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of always holding that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reasons for subjecting certain individuals or corporations to discriminating legislation.

5.      No one may speak for the Parliament and Parliament is never before the Court. After Parliament has said what it intends to say, only the Court may say what the Parliament meant to say. None else. Once a statute leaves Parliament House, the Court's is the only authentic voice which may echo (interpret) the Parliament. This the Court will do with reference to the language of the statute and other permissible aids. The executive Government may place before the Court their understanding of what Parliament has said or intended to say or what they think was Parliament's object and all the facts and circumstances which in their view led to the legislation. Validity of Legislation is not to be judged merely by affidavits filed on behalf of the State, but by all the relevant circumstances which the court may ultimately find and more especially by what may be gathered from what the legislature has itself said. [AIR 1992 SC 999] [(1983) 1 SCR 1000]

6.      In determining the impact of State action upon constitutional guarantees which are fundamental, it follows that the extent of protection against impairment of a fundamental right is determined not by the object of the Legislature nor by the form of the action, but by its direct operation upon the individual's rights, that is to say, It is not the object of the authority, making the law, nor the form of action, it is the effect of the law and of the action upon the right which attracts the jurisdiction of the Court to grant relief.

7.      A statute may direct its provisions against one individual person or things or to several individual person or things; but no reasonable basis of classification may appear on the face of it or be deducible from the surrounding circumstances; or matters of common knowledge. In such a case the Court will strike down the law as an instance of naked discrimination.

8.      If the legislative policy is clear and definite, and as an effective method of carrying out that policy, a discretion is vested by the statute upon a body of administrators or officers to make selective application of the law, to certain classes or groups of persons, the statute itself cannot be condemned as a piece of discriminatory legislation. In such cases, the power given to the executive body would import a duty on it to classify the subject-matter of legislation in accordance with the objective indicated in the statute. If the administrative body proceeds to classify persons or things, on a basis which has no rational relation to the objective of the Legislature, its action can be annulled as offending against the equal protection clause. On the other band, if the statute itself does not disclose a definite policy or objective, and it confers authority on another to make selection at its pleasure, the statute would be held on the face of it to be discriminatory, irrespective of the way in which it is applied.

9.      In determining the validity or otherwise of a statute or of the statutory provision, the Court have to examine whether such classification is or can be reasonably regarded as based upon some “rational and sound principles” which distinguishes such persons or things grouped together from those left out of the group; and whether such “rational and sound principles” has a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute.

10.  In determining the impact of State action upon constitutional guarantees which are fundamental, it follows that the extent of protection against impairment of a fundamental right is determined not by the object of the Legislature nor by the form of the action, but by its direct operation upon the individual's rights, that is to say, It is not the object of the authority, making the law, nor the form of action, it is the effect of the law and of the action upon the right which attracts the jurisdiction of the Court to grant relief.

11.  Though a law ex-facie appears to treat all that fall within a class alike, if in effect it operates unevenly on persons or property similarly situated, it may be said that the law offends the equality clause. It will then be the duty of the court to scrutinize the effect of the law carefully to ascertain its real impact on the persons or property similarly situated. Conversely, a law may treat persons who appear to be similarly situated differently; but on investigation they may be found not to be similarly situated. To state it differently, it is not the phraseology of a statute that governs the situation but the effect of the law that is decisive.

12.  Hon’ble Justice Vivian Bose in the case of State of W. B.  V. Anwar Ali Sarkar – AIR 1952 SC 75, among other things, made a remarkable observation, and I quote: “What I have to determine is whether the differentiation made offends what I may call the social conscience of a sovereign democratic republic…. The question with which I charge myself is, can fair-minded reasonable unbiased and resolute men, who are not swayed by emotion or prejudice, regard this with equanimity and call it reasonable, just and fair, regard it as that equal treatment and protection in the defence of liberties which is expected of a sovereign democratic republic in the conditions which obtain in India today?”

The above principles may be considered by the Hon’ble Court whilst they adjudicate the constitutionality of impugned law attacked as discriminatory and violative of the equal protection of the laws.

Concluding remarks

1.      The law of the Constitution is not only for those who govern, and, for the theorist, but also for the bulk of the people, for the common man, for whose benefit & pride, and, safeguard, the Constitution has also been written.

2.      The mere solemn object of the legislation is no justification for its enactment; and the law enacted has to pass the test of Constitutional norms and standards.

3.      Notwithstanding, the enacted law may have been emanated from the “Body of wisdom”, the wisdom of the Constitution should prevail.




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